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I. Introduction
Trade theorists' approach to trade policy has always been somewhat
schizophrenic. Theorists make their mark by working out in elaborate
detail new ways in which policy interventions can enhance national
well—being. This tradition extends from Bhagwati's (1971) exhaustive
categorization of distortions and appropriate policy responses to the
more recent work on "strategic" trade policy (Brander and Spencer,
1985; Krugman, 1984; see also McCulloch, 1993) . On the other hand,
most trade theorists would recoil in horror at the thought that a
government may take them seriously, and attempt to implement the
finely—tuned subsidies or tariffs that their theories often call for.
The image of government that most trade economists carry with them is
of one that is fundamentally incompetent and, worse still, hostage to
special interests. While this contrast exists in all branches of
economics, it is perhaps sharpest in international trade, because the
desirability of free trade is so sacrosanct.
In many of the standard models, the government is viewed as
omniscient and omnipotent, achieving any desired result with the
stroke of a pen. These models obviously demand too much of the
government. Their policy conclusions can be easily weakened (and
sometimes reversed) by considering informational constraints or
alternative strategic assumptions. This tradition is exemplified by
papers such as Eaton and Grossman's (1986) treatment of strategic
export subsidization, Dixit's (1989) criticism of models of tariffs as
social insurance, and Carmichael's (1987) modelling of U.S. export
credit subsidies. A somewhat different but equally damnning
literature focuses on the unintended, if predictable, consequences of
2trade policy, such as the migration of production to third countries
to evade country—specific quotas or quality upgrading in response to
quantitative restrictions. Baldwin (1982) provides a thorough
compendium of such unintended results.
But fundamentally the trade economist's suspicions of trade
policy transcend these technical considerations. These suspicions are
more deeply rooted in a general skepticism regarding the ability of
governments to act in the common good, rather than as an instrument of
special interests. Hence, Krugman (1993) draws a distinction between
what he calls "narrow" and 'broad" arguments for free trade: "The
broad argument for free trade, to which many economists implicitly
subscribe, is essentially political: free trade is a pretty good, if
not perfect policy, while an effort to deviate from it in a
sophisticated way will probably end up doing more harm than good"
(Krugmro, 1993, 364). Or as Grossman (1987, 65) puts it: "the market
failures in the political realm might easily outweigh those in the
economic realm, leaving us with a Set of strategic trade policies that
would serve only the interests of those fortunate enough to gain
favor." Hence, the preference for laissez—faire is based
fundamentally on political reasoning of a certain type, leading in
turn to a specific presumption about the capability of states to
deliver effective policies.
This particular presumption——that states lack the capacity to
deliver appropriate policies——may be correct in most contexts. The
trouble is that it may also be false. We don't know, because trade
economists rarely concern themselves for long with policy formulation
and implementation. Standards of evidence and substantiation are
notoriously weak in the trade literature when it comes to
3effectiveness of actual policies; anecdote and stylized fact are
easily merged and woven around formal models, providing support for
whatever theoretical demonstration is at hand. And appeals to
political—economy arguments for non—intervention are more often than
not simply a whole lot of hand-waving.
A more appealing starting point is to grant that that there
exists such a thing called "state capability", that some states may be
adequately endowed with it, that others may not be, and that state
capabilities can sometimes be enhanced where they are lacking. This
broadened perspective may then allow us to use economists' tools to
attempt to understand when policy is effective and why. This paper
represents one small step in this research agenda. In what follows, I
will draw on evidence on the use of one particular prlicy——export
subsidization——in a variety of countries to highlight a number of
interesting issues, puzzles, and findings that emerge when we start to
take trade policy seriously.'
None of the above should be construed to imply that there is a
dearth of research on the effectiveness of policy, and on state
capabilites more broadly. Far from it. To cite one significant
strand of thought, the extent to which states can act "autonomously"
in formulating and implementing policy has long been a central concern
in the political science literature.2 I will draw on some of this work
'As will become clear, my focus is on effectiveness rather than
efficiency (in the economist's sense) of policy. I do not ask whether
a certain policy was beneficial or not, simply whether it produced the
intended result. Analysis of efficiency is contingent on an analysis
of effectiveness.
2peter Evans, a sociologist, writes (1992, 141) "Recognition of
the importance of state capacity, not simply in the sense of of the
prowess and perspicacity of technocrats within the state apparatus but
also in the sense of an institutional structure that is durable and
effective, is characteristic of the third wave of thinking about the
4below. In addition, there is a literature oriented- towards developing
rules—of—thumb for practitioners, mostly generated at (or by> the
World Bank (see, for example, Thomas and Nash, l991a) . What is
lacking is serious engagement by academic economists——even those
interested in policy——in research on these issues. That is a pity for
two reasons. First, economists' analytical toolkit and parsimonious
approach to understanding the real world may have much to contribute
to this area.3 Second, unless economists devote this effort, their
models of policy are condemned to remain naive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
contains a preliminary discussion of the determinants of policy
effectiveness. I next turn to two successful cases of export
subsidization (Korea and Brazil, section III), followed by two
failures (Kenya and Bolivia, section IV), and two intermediate cases
(India and Turkey, section V) . A concluding discussion and some
comments on the U.S. case are presented in Section VI.
state and development." By the first and second waves, Evans is
referring to the conceptions of the state as an effective agent of
change and as a hindrance, respectively. For a recent survey of the
political science and sociology literature on the state, see Barkey
and Parikh (1991)
3The more time I spent with the political science literature on
state autonomy (mentioned above and discussed below), the more
convinced I became of this point. To an economist, this literature
appears as remarkably lacking in concreteness, transparent cause—and—
effect relationships, and (in principle) testable hypotheses, not to
mention practical guidance. On the other hand, Sharyn O'Halloran has
reminded me that there is a sizable recent literature in American
politics that pays close attention to issues of institutional design,
often drawing on economists' tools. An application of this literature
to comparative policy issues may well prove to be a productive effort.
5II. Preliminary Considerations
A good starting point is to consider the models that we do have with
some relevance to a discussion of state capability and policy
effectiveness. There are three sets of economic models that I think
are invaluable in thinking about policy formulation and
implementation: (I) models of dynamic—inconsisten'y of policy; (ii)
models with irreversibilities and hysteresis; and (iii) models of
rent—seeking. Each of these has a distinct lesson for what makes
policy effective.
The basic model of dynamic inconsistency points to the costs of
discretionary behavior by government officials and brings out the
advantage of rule—based policy regimes which entail high degrees of
pre—commitment. Two significant applications of these ideas in the
area of trade policy can be found in Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and
Matsuyama (1990) . The first of these papers shows the bias towards
excessive protection on the part of governments that care about income
distribution, while the second demonstrates the difficulties of
disciplining firms by threatening to remove protection, a threat that
is hardly credible ex post. In each case, a clear implication is that
designing schemes that would enhance policy makers commitment to ex—
ante rules would be desirable.
Models with irreversibilities demonstrate the importance of
policy stability, or more accurately, predictability in coaxing the
desired response from the private sector. When supply decisions are
subject to sunk costs, unpredictability about future policy can
seriously dampen the supply response to any policy change (Dixit,
1989; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993), and potentially render a prima—
facie desirable policy change harmful (Rodrik, 1991) . Combined with
6Calvo's (1989) demonstration that a lack of credibility in trade
policy amounts to an intertemporal distortion, this literature
underscores the importance of building predictability into the policy
making process.
Finally, the rent—seeking approach to trade policy, originating
from Krueger's (1974) venerable article, reminds us that policies that
create rents will also create rent—seekers. This in turn generates
incentives for bureaucrats to create rents in the first place
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). These ideas lie at the core of the
neoclassical political—economy literature on trade policy, where rent—
seeking interest groups and rent—providing policy maers interact to
produce inefficient policy configurations (Grossman and Helpman, 1992,
provide a recent example') The implications are bleak for policy
making: policy interventions should be avoided as a rule, but if they
cannot, they should be undertaken in a manner that keeps private
groups at arms' length.
Taken together, these theoretical ideas yield quite a coherent
story about what constitutes a good policy regime. Successful
government programs are likely to contain the following
characteristics:
• they apply simple and uniform rules, rather than selective
and differentiated ones;
• they endow bureaucrats with few discretionary powers;
• they contain safeguards against frequent, unpredictable
alteration of the rules;
• they keep firms and other organized interests at arms'
'Although, they also allow the government tc place an exogenous
weight on aggregate efficiency.
length from the policy formulation and implementation
process.
These conclusions seem broadly reasonable, and lists like the above
are often drawn in policy discussions.
When I first decided to take on export subsidies as a case study,
I was expecting that the evidence on what makes some programs
succcessful and others failures would validate these conclusions. I
was wrong. While the models mentioned above are useful in
understanding what happens, the broad generalizations that one is
tempted to draw from them are much less so. In fact, as a first cut,
these broad conclusions have more explanatory power when they are
turned upside down! The two most successful progran' of export
subsidization I found, those in South Korea and Brazil, were highly
complex and selective, differentiated by firm, subject to frequent
changes, gave bureaucrats enormous discretionary powers, and entailed
close interaction between bureaucrats and firms. On the other hand,
the least successful programs in my sample, those in Kenya and
Bolivia, consisted of simple, across—the—board, and non—selective
subsidies.
What is going on here? I think the answer is that there is a lot
that we do not know or understand about state capabilities and policy
effectiveness. This underscores the point made in the introduction
about the need to get economists seriously engaged in these issues.
With regard to export subsidies, there are two concepts that I
have found useful in characterizing the differences in outcomes across
countries. The first, and more fundamental, one is the notion of
state autonomy. This refers to the degree to which the state and
administrative apparatus of a society is insulated from organized
8private interests, and consequently can exercise discipline over them.5
The second useful notion is that of policy coherence, meaning a
clearly articulated, stable, and non—conflicting set of policy
priorities. I will be using these terms in a descriptive, rather than
explanatory, fashion, as it remains unclear whether they can be
operationalized in a meaningful manner.
The evidence from the case studies point to some simple
conclusions. Policies work best when autonomy and coherence are both
present; they fail when neither is. However, policy coherence on its
own is worth something: coherent programs can be successfully
formulated and implemented even when autonomy is lacking, but at the
cost of some abuse. One important implication for economic analysis
is the following: while the state may not be an omniscient social—
welfare maximizer, neither is it a tool of lobbying groups as in much
of the recent political—economy literature. To understand where each
case fits, we have to dig deeper than we are prone to do.
As mentioned above, the concept of state autonomy is borrowed
from the political science literature. However, it has an important
antecedent in Gunnar Myrdal's magisterial work on Asian development,
Asian Drama (1968). In his study of Asian societies, Myrdal was
struck by how little states asked of their citizens, and how incapable
they were of eliciting compliance when they tried. The result was a
pattern of economic policy making that was all carrots and no stick.
Myrdal christened such states as "soft states", and contrasted them
with their opposite, "strong states". This distinction, under
different names, has survived. For example, Jones and Sakong's (1980)
5Occasionally the literature draws a distinction between the two
parts of this definition, referring to the first as "autonomy" and the
second as "capacity". See Barkey and Parikh (1991, 525—26)
9excellent study of policy making in South Korea harks back to this
distinction, and the authors locate the key to that country's stellar
performance in the presence of a "hard" state (more on this below>
State autonomy, as the term is usually used, is effectively a
measure of how "strong" or "hard" a state is. Migdal (1988> is a good
source on how political scientists have approached the issue of state
strength and societal control, as well as on attempts to quantify
these concepts. I find it helpful to think of autonomy as the extent
to which the state can act as a Stackelberg leader c'er private
groups, rather than as a Stackelberg follower; states that fall in the
first category are strong, while states in the second category are
weak.6 The existing literature is not very helpful on where autonomy
comes from and how it is acquired. Most studies point to distinctive
historical experience: Migdal (1988), for example, emphasizes massive
social dislocations, such as war, revolution, or mass migration, as a
precondition to the existence of strong states.'
Going back to our list of what constitutes a good policy regime,
then, these conclusions turn out to be too pessimistic about state
capabilities in societies governed by strong states. On the other
hand, they are too optimistic about the capabilities of weak states——
and that is really bad news! In either case, they provide a bad fit.
'See Rodrik, 1992, for a first attempt to formalize this. Using a
highly stylized model of interaction between the government and the
private sector, I show that, compared to a strong state (the
Stackelberg leader), a weak state (a Stackelberg follower)
systematically underprovides economically desirable interventions, and
systematically overprovides politically motivated (and economically
harmful) interventions.
-
'As Migdal puts it, "[aJll these cases (Israel, Cuba, China,
Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea] of relatively
strong states have occurred in societies in which major social
disturbances rocked existing structures within the last half—century"
(1988, 269)
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I will expand on these points in the following sections. Export
subsidization is a good area to try some of these ideas out for a
number of reasons. For one thing, it is the policy on which the
strategic trade policy literature has focussed. Second, it is very
common: most countries have tried it at some time or another, and this
provides a large sample. Third, the administration of export
subsidies tends to be "organizationally demanding" (Levy, 1993, 257),
opening a window into contrasts in state capabilities. Finally, the
received wisdom on export subsidies is that they have not been
effective (Nogués, 1990, and Thomas and Nash, 1991b)
III. Two Successful Cases: Korea and Brazil
A. KOREA
Korea's phenomenal export boom starting in the early 1960s is well
known. Less well known is the significant role played by the Korean
government's micro—management of export incentives in producing the
boom. It is not a great exaggeration to say that the manner in which
the Korean bureaucracy administered and coordinated the export push of
the 1960s and 1970s is reminiscent of the way that the military
command of a nation would run a war.
Under the Rhee government of the 1950s, Korean policy was
preoccupied by largely political considerations, and the government
attached no particular importance to either economic growth or exports
)Jones and Sakong, 1980, 272—273) . While there were some export
subsidies, they were implemented haphazardly, and often not budgeted
at all (Frank etal., 1975, 38—39). This changed dramatically after
Park took over in a military coup on May 16, 1961. Park made exports
his top priority, and aside from devaluing the won, greatly expanded
11
the scope of export subsidization. Table 1 shows estimates of the
combined ad—valorem equivalents of export subsidies during 1958—70.
Two significant jumps in the subsidies are evident from the data, one
in 1961—62 and another one in 1966—67.
Thble 1: Export Subsidies in Korea, 1958-70 (%)
direct
subsidies taxexemptions dutyexemptions
credit
subsidies Total
— —
1958
1959
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
.00
.00
2.30
.53
.30
.53
1960 fl.00 0.00 .00 .85 .85
1961
—
.89 fl.00 .00 .75 .64
1962
—
7.94 4.35 .58 .66 16.54
1963 3.14 .67 .06 .20 15.07
1964
—
—
.36 3.86 4.66 12.68
1965 .00 6.11 5.79 2.86 14.76
1966 .00 7.54 7.85 3.79 19.18
1967 .00 8.52 9.07 5.45 23.04
1968 .00 8.27 14.32 5.50 28.10
1969 0.00 9.07 11.89 5.11 26.06
1970 0.00 9.61 12.66 5.57 27.84
Source: Calculated from Frank etal., 1975, Table 5—8.
Exporters had access to a bewildering array of subsidies in this
period. Direct cash grants were important very early on, but were
phased out by 1965, and replaced by tax and import duty exemptions.
In that year, the priority given to exporters in acquiring import
licenses was formalized and expanded: exporters were allowed duty—free
imports of raw materials and intermediate inputs up to a limit. This
limit was determined administratively, on the basis of firms' and
industries' input—output coefficients plus a margin of "wastage
allowance". Since the imports acquired under the wastage allowance
could be sold in the domestic market, this was a significant subsidy
and was Consciously used as such. Frank etal. (1975, 66) estimate
12
that the wastage allowance alone provided an export subsidy of 4.6
percent in 1968 on average, and up to 17—21 percent in certain fabrics
and footwear. Bureaucrats had virtually unrestricted discretion in
setting wastage allowances, and their generosity varied from time to
time (Frank etal., 50). Businesses and trade associations regularly
lobbied for increased allowances.
Subsidized credit to exporters was another significant incentive.
As Table 1 shows, it became particularly important after 1966. Frank
etal. (1975, Table 5—5) list twelve different types of preferential
loans to exporters that were operative in the 1967—1970 period.
A noteworthy feature of the Korean export subsidies is that they
applied not only to the final exporters, but to the indirect exporters
as well (i.e., the firms that supplied the intermediate inputs used in
exportables) . The available econometric evidence indicates that
exports were highly sensitive to subsidies: Jung and Lee (1986)
estimate that a 1 percent increase in export subsidies eventually led
to more than a 2 percent increase in export supply. Intriguingly,
they also find that the elasticity of export supply with respect to
the real exchange rate was smaller than this.
These subsidies were disbursed against a background of highly
unusual government—business relationship. One of the first acts of
the Park regime was to arrest most of the country's leading
businessmen and to threaten the confiscation of their assets under a
recently passed Law for Dealing with Illicit Wealth Accumulation
(Jones and Sakong, 1980, 69)8. A compromise was then arranged by which
these businessmen would build factories and turn their shares over to
8This law was actually passed by the short—lived Chang Myon regime
intervening between the Rhee and Park years, but its implementation
took place under Park's government.
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the government in exchange for their release. The matter was
eventually closed in December 1964 with most businessmen paying their
fines in cash (with fines amounting to a total sum of $16 million)
The planned transfer of ownership never took place. "Nonetheless, as
Jones and Sakong remark (1980, 70), "the basic pattern was set, with
businessmen in a decidedly subordinate role" to the state.
The ability of the government to elicit the desired response from
firms by a combination of cajoling, arm—twisting, and threats was
characteristic of the manner in which the export subsidies were
administered. Westphal's description of the situation is worth
quoting at length:
(Tihe [Korean] government has not relied solely on market forces
acting in response to incentives. It has also used publicly
announced, quarterly export targets for individual commodities,
markets, and firms. Contact between government and business in
the day-to-day implementation of these targets has been close.
Next to the responsible minister's office, an "export situation
room" was established, laid out so that potential export
shortfalls could be identified at a glance. A large staff has
maintained almost daily contact with major exporters, and it has
not been uncommon for the minister to intervene in difficult
situations; for example, to obtain immediate customs clearence
for inputs being delayed on some pretext. Progress towards
targets and the current trade situation have been regularly
reviewed at a Monthly Trade Promotion Conference, chaired by the
president and attended by ministers, bankers, and the more
successful exporters, large and small.
The highest export achievements have brought national awards
as well as material benefits bestowed through discretionary means
[including] additional preferences in the general allocation
of credit under a system of government directed bank lending and
relaxed tax surveillance under a revenue system that gives
government officials considerable latitude in determining tax
liabilities. ... Conversely, indolence has been deterred by the
perception that discretion could be——indeed, sometimes was——
exercised in ways that impose material costs or deny potential
benefits in other areas of a firm's activity. (Westphal, 1990,
45—46.)
There was clear understanding on the part of firms that good export
performance would be rewarded by various kinds of government benefits,
while poor performance would bring forth penalties. Most notable
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among the penalties were tax inspection and collection applied more
rigorously than usual (Rhee etal., 1984, 92).
As the passage quoted above makes clear, the government issued
specific export targets for firms (as well as commodities and export
markets) . When the government first began to issue such targets, the
heads of firms are reported to have willingly complied, "with the[ir)
memory still fresh of their being jailed by the new regime for the
illicit accummulation of wealth" (Rhee etal., 1984, 21). Eventually,
firms began to set their own targets, but remained constrained by past
performance as well as the vigilance of bureaucrats in extracting
maximum export performance.9"°
The extent to which the government's priorities and resources
were organized around export performance is striking. As mentioned in
the passage by Westphal above, the monthly trade promotion conferences
were chaired by President Park himself, and he often took decisions on
the spot. Exports were monitored literally on a daily basis:
The head of the export promotion office in the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry has at his side a computer printout of
progress against targets by industry and by firms. The data is
for the preceding day, which is all the more remarkable when it
is considered that most developing countries do not have
aggregate information on exports for many months. The printout
is also broken down by geographic region. If sales in a region
9Around half or more of the firms surveyed by Rhee et al. (1984)
reported that the export targets had negative effects onf1ifirm in
terms of profitability or sales diversion. Enterprise—level export
targets have also been used, apparently quite successfully, in China
(see Panagariya, 1993)
'°As it turned out, most firms regularly exceeded their targets.
Balassa (1978) reads this as evidence that targets did not play an
important role. However, that fact itself says nothing about how
binding these requirements were ex ante: for one thing, Korean exports
grew at a stupendous rate that would have been impossible to predict
beforehand; secondly, there was a general expectation that failure to
meet targets would attract penalties, creating strong incentives for
fulfillment; third, over—fulfillment brought rewards from the
administration.
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are not up to target, the Korean ambasadors there are recalled to
find out what the problems are and what can be done to spur
Korean sales. And in the foyer of the head office of the Korean
Traders' Association is a big board tracking the progress of each
industry towards its target. The export associations of each
industry, the nodes for all information flows on exports, have
their own boards tracking progress. So do firms on the shop
floors, where workers——dressed in uniforms that give all of
industry a paramilitary air——keep track of their firm's progress
toward targets and of that by competitors down the street. (Rhee
et al., 1984, 22)
The extreme discretion that trade officials had allowed them to be
flexible and respond quickly to changes in circumstances. For
example, export targets for automotive products were scaled down more
than once during the 1970s (Westphal, 1990, 54), and a survey by Rhee
etal. (1984) found that nearly a third of the respondents had their
targets revised during 1973—75." But when asked whether a firm had
any say in setting the export target for itself, 47 of the 97 firms
replied negatively.
Without these two institutional innovations——the practice of
setting and monitoring export targets and the holding of monthly trade
promotion conferences——the export incentives themselves would arguably
not have been as effective (Rhee etal., 1984). These were
instrumental in communicating the top leadership's priorities to lower
level bureaucrats and to firms alike, in resolving administrative
problems quickly, and as a combined carrot-and—stick strategy more
"Here is how Jones and Sakong (1980, 61) describe the down side
of the discretionary environment: 'Businessmen often complain about
the sudden shifts in policy direction, and (at a decidedly lower level
of importance) academics are regularly frustrated when their critiques
of policy become outdated before reaching print." But according to
Rhee et al. (1984, 36): "Firms ... saw the flexibility and frequent
adjustments in the incentive system not as characteristics that would
create uncertainty about the automaticity and stability of that
system. They saw them as part of the government's long-term
commitment to keep exports profitable
16
broadly. To the question of why firms did not systematically
manipulate the incentives or Set low targets (as in socialist
economies), the simple answer is that state officials were on top of
things. In turn, low—level corruption on the part of bureaucrats
themselves was ruled out by the high priority given to the export
drive by the top leadership.
The Korean state's strength (or autonomy) is usually ascribed to
a number of distinctive circumstances. According to Pznsden (1989,
54), "[tjhe Korean state was able to consolidate its power in the
1960s because of the weakness of the social classes. Workers were a
small percentage of the population, capitalists were dependent on
state largesse, the aristocracy was dissolved by land reform, and the
peasantry was atomized into smallholders. ' Others like Evans (1992)
also stress the importance of a tradition of meritocratic bureaucracy.
Such historical consideration, however, do not explain how the Korean
state under Park was able to metamorphose itself from its poor cousin
under Rhee.12 We also need to take into account the coherence of
export policies under Park——the consistent priority given to them at
the expense of other objectives—-and the lack thereof under Rhee.
B. BRAZIL
Brazil's economy has been so mismanaged since the early 1980s that it
is hard to imagine the presence there of an effective program of
export subsidies. Yet starting in the second half of the 1960s an
extensive set of export incentives was successfully implemented and
'2Survey results reported in Jones and Sakong (1980, Table 22)
show a striking difference in firms' perceptions with regard to the
effectiveness and hardness of economic policies under the two regimes.
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led——alongside a crawling exchange rate policy——to an impressive
increase in manufactured exports. It was this export performance that
prompted many observers to talk about a "Brazilian miracle," until the
debt crisis of 1982 and macroeconomic mismanagement turned the economy
into a big mess.
Prior to the military coup of 1964, government policy in Brazil
did not attach particular attention to exports, in keeping with the
bias towards import—substitution. The incoming government, like
Park's regime, developed a clear commitment to exports. There was
some liberalization of import restrictions, a move (in 1968) to a
crawling peg regime to maintain competitiveness, and the development
of an extensive and generous system of export subsidies for
Table 2: Export Subaidie. in Brazil, 1969-1985 (%)
Duty
drawback
BEFIEX Tax credit
premium
credit
subsidies
Income
tax
exemot.
Total
969 4.0 —— 6.7 4.1 0.
—
14.8
970 4.0 —— 13.5 7.5 0. 25.0
971 4.0 —— 13.2 7.8 1. 26.3
972 4Q n.a. 16.3 8.2 1.
—
30.7
—
n.a. 16.2 6.5 1. 31.2
974 12 . n.a. 12.0 6.1 . 32.5
975 8 . n.a. 12.1 11.5 .7 33.6
976
977
11.
12.
3.6
4.6
11.7
12.4
15.9
19.6 — :. 50.7
978 9 . 5.0 12.8 17.0 . 45.7
979 10. 5.4 12.8 13.9 . 44.7
980 9 . 8.1 0.0 2.0 1: 21.0
981 9 . 10.2 6.5 18.7 1.8 46.6
982 10.
—
7.7 9.1 21.7 1.6 50.4
983 8.
—
4.9 7.8 9.3 1.6 32.2
984
1985
9. —
9.
4.3
5.9
7.8
1.4
2.7
3.6
1.6
1.6
25.5
21.6
Source: Clements (1988), pp. 15—17, and GATT (1992), Table IV. 14—15.
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manufactures. These subsidies included duty and tax rebates, income
tax exemption, credit subsidies, and many others (see Table 2) . By
the latter half of the l970s, the combined value of these subsidies
stood close to 50 percent of exports. As in Korea, these subsidy
programs were implemented in a highly selective and discriminatory
manner. Export subsidization varied greatly from industry to
industry, as well as from firm to firm. Almost without exception, the
larger firms obtained a disproportionate share of the subsidies
(Fasano—Filho etal., 1987, 66).
The effectiveness of these subsidies appears beyond question. In
a survey of export subsidies in Latin America, Nogues (1990) lists
only the Brazilian case as a success. Fasano—Filho et al. (1987)
provide econometric evidence of their importance in export supply
decisions. A World Bank study (1983, 121) credits the BEFIEX program
(discussed below) for stimulating a significant amount of new
investments oriented towards world markets. Perhaps most telling of
all is that Brazilian manufactured exports expanded at an annual
average rate of 38 percent during the l970s.
Among the subsidies listed in Table 2, one stands out in terms of
effectiveness and distinctiveness. This is the BEFIEX program,
introduced in 1972. (BEFIEX is the Brazilian acronym for Fiscal
Benefits for Special Export Programmes.) According to Fritsch and
Franco (1992, 9), this was the most important of the export subsidies.
The scheme was unusual in that it entailed the signing of long—term
contracts (for usually 10 years) by participating firms detailing
their export commitments. Aside from these export commitments, firms
'3Evans (1979, 93—94) characterizes post—1964 Brazil as "a case of
espousing liberal free enterprise while acting to increase vastly the
economic role of the state, both regulatory and entrepreneurial."
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also had to satisfy minimum local—content requirements in order to
qualify for BEFIEX incentives. The contracts were negotiated with the
BEFIEX administration on the basis of detailed information on firms'
activities and strategic plans. The incentives, in turn, typically
included "90% reduction of import duties and the Industrialized
Products Tax (IPI) on imported machinery and equipment; 50% reduction
on import duties and IPI tax on imported raw materials, parts and
components, and other intermediate products; exemption from the
'similarity' test; and income tax exemption on profits attributable to
exports of manufactured products" (GATT, 1992, l04).'
Between 1972—1985, 316 contracts were signed, mainly with
multinational enterprises in the transport equipment and textile and
Figure 1
/I'iIIIIIIu,
"The "similarity test" in the quote refers to the infamous law
that prohibited the importation of foreign products when similar
products were available domestically.
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clothing industries. In the automotive sector, GM, Ford, and VW each
committed to $1 billion of exports over ten years, Fiat to $550
million, and Mercedes Benz to $500 million (Shapiro, 1993, 213; World
Bank, 1983, 257) . The effect of the program in this sector was
nothing short of dramatic. As shown in Figure 1, automotive exports
rose from virtually nothing in 1972 to more than $1 billion in 1980.
Total exports under BEFIEX contracts increased to $8.2 billion by
1990, at which time the program was phased out as part of an overall
trade liberalization. According to a GATT study (1992, 104(, BEFIEX—
linked exports eventually covered about half of all manufactured
exports.
To an economist, perhaps the most striking thing about BEFIEX is
the apparent absence of gaming between firms and the government and of
renegotiation of initial contract terms. Participation in BEFIEX
meant that firms were under legal obligation to live up to their
export commitments, irrespective of economic circumstances such as
foreign demand conditions or exchange—rate fluctuations. These were
tough terms, and firms apparently lived by them. In her study of the
Brarilian automotive industry, Shapiro (1993) mentions instances in
which multinationals had to make adjustments to their global
strategies——by cutting back exports from third countries, for example—
—so as not to run afoul of BEFIEX export commitments.5 This must be
confounding to economists who generally believe that long-term
' In the late 1980s, GM headguarters allowed the Brazilian
subsidiary to export engines to GM—Opel (Germany) for the first time,
even though the firm's global strategy had assigned the European
market to its Australian subsidiary. "GM was forced to grant Brazil
access to the European market.. . [because otherwise) GMB [GM—Brazil]
would not have been able to meet its export commitments.. ." (Shapiro,
1993, 222) . Fiat began to export the Uno from Brazil, even though it
would not have done so without BEFIEX (ibid., 223).
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contracts are not enforcable, especially when the government is on one
side, and must come under severe renegotiation pressure in response to
unforeseen circumstances. In this instance the Brazilian state had
the capacity to discipline firms, and was perceived as such. It is
difficult to envisage this kind of discipline being exerted in the
countries that we will turn to next.'6
Just as in the Korean case, the reasons for the Brazilian state's
strength and autonomy in the area of export policy remain murky. Leff
argues in his study of economic policy making during the earlier 1947-
64 period that the Brazilian government could always act autonomously
from special interest groups, and impose policy rather freely (Leff,
1968). His description of Brazil is reminiscent of Jones and Sakong's
(1980) Korea. On pre—1964 export policy, he writes: "policy here was
made in direct opposition to the interests of major private groups,
the exporters and the landed elites producing primary products, in
deference instead to doctrines which commanded widespread influence
among the government administrators and in elite opinion" (Leff, 1968,
77).' He lists several reasons for the state's autonomy, and notes in
particular the emergence of a strong government Ej2 to the
development of manufacturing interests.
Evans (1992) presents a rather different picture of the Brazilian
state, much less autonomous, and having to contend with important
'6lndeed, in Turkey's case export commitments were formally
demanded, but remained on paper.
'7Hence, Leff leaves no doubt that autonomy did not come with the
military coup——it existed prior to 1964. This is important because it
suggests that authoritarianism need not be a pre—condition for
autonomy. Jones and Sakong also express doubt about the relationship
between authoritarianism and autonomy in the case of Korea: "Until the
early 1970s, the Park regime was both hard and reasonably democratic"
(1980, 140)
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social groups. Evans notes that clientelism was rampant, that the
bureaucracy had (compared to Korea, for example) much less of a
tradition of meritocracy, and that there was no policy coordination
within the state. "Even the military regime, which had the greatest
structural potential for insulation from clientelistic pressures,
proved unable to construct an administrative guidance relationship
with the local industrial elite" (Evans, 1992, 170) . However, he
notes the presence of "important pockets of state efficiency,
mentioning in particular the state's relationship with the auto
sector. The co—existence of pockets of autonomy with general state
weakness rings true in light of the macroeconomic crisis in which the
Brazilian state——virtually alone in Latin America——still remains
deeply mired. It suggests the possibility that state strength may
vary not only across time but also across sectors and issues.
IV. Two Failure,: Kenya and Bolivia
A. Kenya
Kenya's export subsidization policy is undistinguished in many
respects, including effectiveness. The only thing that recommends it
to our attention is the presence of a good study by Patrick Low
(1982), who observed it at close distance. -
Compared to the Korean and Brazilian programs we have just
discussed, the Kenyan scheme was on paper an economist's dream: it
could not have been simpler, less discretionary, nor more uniform.
The Local Manufactures (Export Compensation) Act of 1974 applied a
straightforward 10 percent export subsidy to most manufactures. (The
rate was increased to 20 percent in 1980.) The only restriction was
that the value of imported goods could not amount to more than 70
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percent of the value of the export. The subsidy was to be paid
through commercial banks, after export proceeds were received and
after government officials processed the subsidy claims.
The effects of the program were imperceptible. Low (1982)
interviewed 55 firms and found that only 16 (29 percent) of them had
responded by increasing exported output. The plurality of firms (17,
or 31 percent) treated the subsidy simply as a windfall, while 7 firms
(13 percent) did not even bother to claim the subsidy. Even more
telling is Low's calculation that at the aggregate level less than 30
percent of eligible exports actually received the subsidy. A very
large number of exporters either did not claim the subsidy or did not
get it.
What seems to have happened is a bit of both. Government
officials processing the subsidy claims exercised such zeal that many
applications were rejected on trivial grounds. Low spent a day with
these officials and observed two claims being rejected, "one because a
date had been inadvertently omitted on a form and the other because
the quadruplicate instead of the sextuplicate copy of the Export Entry
form had been submitted with the claim" (1982, 297) . The officials
also took their time. More than a quarter of the firms interviewed by
Low expected to wait more than six months after claims had been filed.
Arid since the claims could not be filed before export proceeds were
actually received, the total waiting time was even longer than this.
The delay and unpredictability explain why many firms did not bother
to claim, and why those that did treated the subsidy as a lump—sum
payment, not to influence their export decisions.
At a deeper level, the failure of this program must be attributed
to the fact that the Kenyan government never clearly sorted out and
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prioritized its objectives as they impinged on the export subsidy
policy. While encouraging exports (or more correctly reducing the
anti—export bias due to import restrictions) was obviously an
objective, it did not rank very high in the overall scheme of things.
Neither was the apparent conflict with the negative fiscal
implications of the program ever resolved. Note that the program was
administered by the Customs and Excise Department, a revenue—raising
body. Since providing the subsidy was expensive, the program as it
stood was subject to a clear time inconsistency: the dynamically
consistent policy was to promise to pay the subsidy but not to do so
(since payment was to occur after exports had gone out) . There was no
commitment to exports on the part of the top leadership (as in Korea
or Brazil) that would help resolve this dilemma on the side of
exports.
In partial recognition of these problems, the government reformed
the program in 1980. The subsidy was raised to 20 percent, coverage
of the scheme was expanded to almost all non—traditional exports, and
an attempt was made to streamline administrative procedures. Two
features of the reform deserve special mention. First, the increase
in the subsidy was accompanied by an equivalent 10 percent surcharge
on imports. This was intended to de—emphasize fiscal considerations
in the implementation of the subsidy, but is also indicative of the
incoherence of policy: by the Lerner symmetry theorem, the import
surcharge served to cancel the effect of the increase in the export
subsidy.le Second, administrative responsibility for the subsidy
scheme was moved from the Customs and Excise Department to the Central
'8Almost The equivalence was not exact, of course, because there
were prevailing tariffs that were generally higher than the pre-
existing 10% export subsidy.
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Bank, an institution with less stake in revenue and greater reputation
for bureaucratic efficiency.
Low's study does not extend to the period after 1980, so we do
not have a good account of how these reforms fared. There is reason
to be skeptical however. A recent account in The Economist (August
14, 1993, 37—38) relates the scandalous story of a Kenyan firm called
Goldenberg. This firm, the sole recipient of a license to export gold
and jewellery, apparently received $54 million in export subsidies
from the Central Bank (amounting to 5 percent of Kenya's total
exports!). Not only was the firm paid a subsidy of 35 percent (rather
than 20 percent, as the law requires), but the foreign firms to which
Goldenberg claimed to have shipped its exports were either fictituous
or had never heard of Goldenberg. Kenya's export policy has
apparently moved from the Scylla of incentive—blunting diligence to
the Charybdes of corrupt generosity.
B. BOLIVIA
Between 1987 and 1991, Bolivia had an export subsidy program similar
to the Kenyan scheme, which also failed for virtually identical
reasons. As the authorities never resolved the conflicting objectives
of safeguarding revenue versus stimulating exports, the exporters
reacted by alternatively ignoring the scheme and badly abusing it.
The export subsidy introduced in July 1987 was in principle aimed
at reimbursing exports for duties paid in imported inputs (hence the
acronym CPA, standing for the initials for Tariff Refund Certificate
in Spanish) . However, rather than create an explicit drawback scheme
which can be an administrative nightmare, the government sensibly set
the subsidy at a uniform 10 percent for non—traditional exports and 5
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percent for traditional exports. (The top rate was subsequently
lowered to 6 percent in August 1990, following a tariff reduction.)
Bolivia had recently come out of a hyperinflation, with inflation
running at more than 40,000 percent per annum and a budget deficit of
more than 20 percent of GDP prior to the stabilization of August 1985.
The authorities were naturally more than slightly nervous about the
budgetary implications of the subsidy. Partly for that reason, the
entry into force of the CRA was delayed. No CRA certificates were
issued before April 1988, and a new regulation in September 1988
retroactively limited the benefits accruing to some of the exporters
having earned CRA rights between July 1987 and April 1988.
Apparently, no CRA payments were made until 1989 (see GATT, 1993,
Table IV.8). And once payments began to be made, enterprising
individuals and firms freely abused the system: there was a famous
case of so—called tourist cows (vacas turistas) in which cow herds
were led across the Bolivian borders several times, collecting CRA
benefits at each crossing (GATT, 1993, 93) . The system was finally
scrapped in April 1991, and replaced by a narrower scheme with lower
financial benefits.
Hence we have once more a clear example of a uniform,
transparent scheme which fails because: (i) delays in payments blunts
incentive effects early on; and (ii) when payments are made,
fraudulent practices take over and cannot be reined in. The
government is then forced to narrow the scope of a scheme which has a
large fiscal impact but little incentive effect.19
'9This combination of delays with fraudulent response is
apparently quite general. Additional cases appeared in Senegal and
Côte d'Ivoire during the second half of the l980s, when the
governments in both cases decided to undertake a simulated devaluation
by increasing import tariffs and export subsidies simultaneously.
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IV. Two Intermediate Cases: Turkey and India
A. TURKEY
Turkish economic policy experienced a radical shift to export
orientation as a result of a dramatic package of measures undertaken
in January 1980 by Turgut özal (then a top technocrat, and
subsequently prime minister and president) . Undertaken in the midst
of a macroeconomic crisis, the package included a devaluation, fiscal
actions, and a series of measures designed to enhance export
incentives. Alongside a flexible exchange—rate policy, the generous
package of export subsidies did much to contribute to the export boom
that ensued (see Arslan and van Wijnbergen, 1990, and Uygur, 1993, for
econometric evidence linking subsidies to export supply) . However, it
also led to much abuse and a phenomenon that came to be called
"fictitious exports"——various forms of fraud designed to take
advantage of the financial incentives.
These subsidies were of many types. They comprised export tax
rebates (supposedly to compensate for indirect taxes, but going well
beyond them), sub—market export credits, foreign exchange allocations
which conferred the right to duty—free imports, corporate tax
reductions (after 1981), and additional tax rebates for enterprises
exporting above a threshold (Milanoviá, 1986; Krueger and Aktan, 1992;
Togan, 1993) . The combined ad-valorem equivalent of these subsidies
rose to 34 percent in 1983, coming down thereafter to around 26
percent (see Table 3). Exports were a top priority for özal, to the
point where "the success of the export drive became almost synonymous
with the success of the stabilization program" (Milanoviã, 1986, 73)
He took pains to ensure that no obstacle stood between an exporter and
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Table 3:_Export Subsidies on Manufactures in Turkey, 1980-86 (%)
Tax
rebates
Export
credits
Foreign
exch.
retent.
& alloc.
VAT
exempt.
Others Total
1980 5.9 5.5 5.8 —— 0.0 17.2
1981 3.6 6.4 4.9 —— 4.0 15.3
1982 9.5 7.2 6.7 —— 6.0 24.0
1983 11.8 7.9 13.0 —— 1.5 34.2
1984 11.3 6.0 4.0 —— 2.0 23.3
1985 3.1 3.2 3.9 10.0 5.8 26.0
1986 1.9 3.6 6.5 10.2 4.6 26.8
Source: Krueger and Aktan (1992), Table 14
his claim to a subsidy. One of his key institutional innovations was
the centralization of export incentives, which had been previously
dispersed among numerous government agencies, in a specific agency,
the Directorate of Incentives and Implementation (TUD) within the
State Planning Organization. Exporters now had to apply to the TUD to
obtain an "export investment certificate", which served as the basis
for receiving all the subsidies discussed above. This stood in stark
contrast with previous practice whereby an exporter would have to
establish his standing with each agency separately. The new system
was simple and rapid, and exporters could get their certificates
within weeks or days (Krueger and Aktan, 1992, 76) 20
Obtaining the export certificate entailed the undertaking of a
quantitative export commitment on whose realization the granting of
incentives in principle depended (Milanoviá, 1986, 6) . In practice,
20There were occasional glitches though. In 1983 and 1984
shortage of government funds led to important arrears in both tax
refunds due to exporters and interest rate rebates for export credits
due to commercial banks (Milanovic, 1986, 48)
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this was a commitment that the government easily waived. According to
Krueger and Aktan (1992, 247, fn 5): "If, for some reason, the export
was not realized, [the firms) simply notified TUD/TUB that they would
not be exporting that amount, and there was no penalty." Firms
believed that the authorities would impose penalties only in cases
where the certificate had been obtained with no intent to export at
all (ibid.).
As mentioned above, these subsidies led to widespread abuse.
Docume,ited cases included instances in which: (i) low—value items such
as scrap metal or stones were exported under the guise of industrial
products with high tax—rebate rates; (ii) low— or medium—grade items
(such as common rugs) were over-invoiced as high—grade (silk rugs);
(iii) the quantity shipped was overstated, as in the case of leather
wallets whose number was blown up by a factor of 10021; and iv) the
most egregious of all, entire export operations took place on paper
only, with no physical transaction ever taking place (these and other
cases are detailed in a popular book by cetin, 1988)
An attempt to quantify the extent of over—invoicing and other
mischief that took place is shown in Figure 2. These estimates are
based on comparisons of Turkish export statistics with OECD statistics
for imports from Turkey. The presence of over—invoicing is
unmistakable. Until 1981, the calculations reveal a small under—
invoicing, which is not surprising in view of the black—market premium
for foreign currency that existed prior to the 1980 stabilization.
But over the course of the first half of the 1980s, over—invoicing
increased steadily, reaching more than 25 percent of export value by
21This case came to light because the exporting firm had neglected
to raise the weight of the Shipment by the same factor, leading to
ridiculously low unit weights (Cetin, 1988, 34).
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1984. It thereafter decreased sharply, partly because of the decline
in subsidies and partly because "fictitious exports" became a hot
political issue and became risky for all but the most adventurous of
firms. It should be mentioned, however, that the Turkish export boom
of the l980s looks only slightly less impressive when over—invoicing
is taken into account. In other words, the boom was not a statistical
illusion by any stretch of the imagination.
Ozal, who was a brilliant technocrat, was fully aware of the
abuses that the subsidies were giving rise to. State officials had
large numbers of files on suspected abuses. But Ozal firmly resisted
the Turkish bureaucracy's inclination to tighten the regulations and
prosecute the fraudulent cases (Cetin, 1988) . He feared that
unleashing the bureaucracy on exporters would do more harm than good,
and discourage the legitimate exporter alongside the fictitious one.
Put differently, unlike in the Korean and Brazilian cases, the Turkish
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bureaucracy could not be trusted to find the right balance between
providing incentives and discouraging potential abusers. He thus
understood very well the dilemma of a weak state: the carrot and the
stick may not be available simultaneously, so one has to go with one
or the other. A corollary is what we may call the second—best law for
weak states: a weak state may become less effective in trying to act
strong.
B. INDIA
Until very recently, India was hardly known for its pro—export
policies. Export subsidies of one kind or another have always been
part of the Indian policy landscape, but these were greatly
overshadowed by a highly restrictive import regime. Here I will focus
on the period before the devaluation of 1966, on which we have the
excellent and enormously detailed study by Bhagwati and Desai (1970)
This is a case of mixed success, somewhat like Turkeys except less
stark. The subsidies in place appear to have played a role in
stimulating exports, but they also led to fraud.
Indian exporters had already access to a variety of fiscal
subsidies during the late 1950s, but these were considerably
strengthened in the course of the early 1960s. The most significant
subsidy, on which I will concentrate, was an import entitlement scheme
under which exporters were awarded import licenses in proportion to
the value of their exports. According to Bhagwati and Desai (1970,
406), the average premium for import licenses were of the order of 70-
80 percent, so the incentive effect of this policy can be easily
imagined.
Bhagwati and Desai characterize Indian state administration in
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the trade policy area as "ad hocism at the top and corruption at the
bottom" (1970, 134) . Yet the import entitlement scheme started out as
a relatively non—discretionary program with well—defined rules. Two
principles were laid down at the outset to govern the schemes
administration: (i) import entitlements would not exceed 75 percent of
the f.o.b. value of exports; and (ii) subject to the previous
constraint, the entitlement would equal only twice the value of an
exporting firms import content (ibid., 409). As it turned out, these
rules were frequently flouted by the authorities who were anxious to
demonstrate success on the export front. Note that since subsidies
consisted of import licenses, they had no immediate fiscal impact
(unlike in Bolivia and Kenya), and there was consequently little
inherent resistance to awarding them. In turn, the officials were
aided in this by exporters themselves who naturally lobbied for the
most generous terms possible. As Bhagwati and Desai put it, the
increasing subsidy "reflected the growing pressure to make exports
more profitable, on the part of the exporters, combined with an
accommodating Ministry whose objective was to maximize export
earnings" (ibid., 426).
Given these pressures, the Indian export subsidy scheme
eventually took on a perverse quality with subsidies awarded in
inverse relationship to an exporter's competitiveness. That is,
exporters could get a subsidy large enough to make their exports
profitable by manipulating the government: "it became generally
possible to ask the Ministry of International Trade for ad hoc
entitlements, for chemical and engineering exports, to make up for any
ostensible difference between the domestic sale price of a product and
its supposed f.o.b. export price plus the subsidy normally available"
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(ibid., 465—66). Bhagwati and Desai also note that the scheme
resulted in significant over—invoicing, as in Turkey.22
For all its problems, Bhagwati and Desai credit the export
subsidies of the period as being "undoubtedly instrumental in
sustaining the spurt in the Indian export performance during the Third
Plan [April 1961—March 1966]" (ibid., 429)
VI. Concluding Remarks
These stories reveal a wide variety of experience with export
subsidies. Policies that look identical on the books often produce
different results, and policies that appear ex ante well designed
frequently result in failure. Perhaps the greatest surprise is that
the most successful programs in our sample were the ones in which
state officials exercised the greatest discretion, applied the least
uniformity (at least ex ante), and interacted the most intensively
with firms. The other cases, however, make clear that these
successful experiences cannot easily be replicated in settings
characterized by weak states.23
22They point out that partner—country trade statistics were not
helpful to get a sense of the magnitude of over—invoicing in this case
because the over—invoicing occurred with free ports like Aden, Hong
Kong, and Panama.
231t is useful to interject here Hernando de Soto's poignant
complaints about the unpredictability of policy—making in Peru; "It is
simply untrue that, in Peru, we are all equal before the law, because
no two people pay the same tax, no two imports are taxed in the same
way, no two exports are subsidized in the same way, and no two
individuals have the same right to credit.... Uncertainty is constant
in the redistributive state, for the Peruvians are aware that the
executive branch, which issues some 110 regulations and decisions each
working day, can change the rules of the game at any moment without
prior consultation or debate" (1989, 195-199) . These complaints ring
true to anyone who has observed policy making in developing countries.
The trouble is that, absent the reference to the redistributive state,
this statement is equally valid for Korean policy making. Jones and
Sakong resolve the paradox in the following manner; "the lesson of the
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The message that comes out of the cases is both pessimistic and
optimistic as regards state capabilities. On the one hand, the
importance of state autonomy, which seems to be determined largely by
historical and structural factors, underscores the point that the
range of options open to most government may be fairly limited. On
the other hand, policy coherence alone counts for something: weak
states can achieve some of their objectives if their priorities are
sufficiently crystallized and if they are creative in designing
appropriate institutional frameworks. Centralizing subsidy functions
in a high—visibility agency (as in Turkey) or processing claims
through the trade ministry rather than the finance ministry (as in
India) are examples of institutional considerations that may make a
large difference in practice.24 Priorities are most clearly
articulated and communicated when there exists political commitment on
the part of the top leadership: in Korea, Brazil, Turkey, success
derived in part from the clear, unmitigated commitment to exports by
new regimes. The case of export subsidies shows that normally
incoherent states can produce coherent policies when they attach a
sufficiently high priority to them. On the other hand, nothing is
Korean case is that in a hard state with leadership commitment to
growth, the Myrdalian objections to discretionary controls on economic
grounds may be obviated. Just as compulsion is necessary, so also is
discretion. Both mechanisms are potentially subject to great abuse,
and their use constitutes a high—risk/high—gain strategy which is
feasible only in a Myrdalian hard state" (1980, 139)
24Wade (1990, 371—77) offers some interesting ideas on how to
improve state effectiveness through institutional engineering, not all
of which however have tremendous operational content. His
recommendations include to "establish a 'pilot agency' or 'economic
general staff' within the central bureaucracy", to "develop effective
institutions of political authority before the system is democratized"
and to "develop corporatist institutions".
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more distinctive about weak states than a multiplicity of conflicting
government objectives.
Some brief remarks on the U.S. case may be worthwhile at this
point, because the feasibility of strategic export subsidization by
the Federal government is an issue that arises frequently. The
American political system is characterized by a strong form of
division of powers, a set of overlapping jurisdictions and policy
responsibilites, and the absence of an independent professional
bureaucracy with a sense of tradition and continuity. These features
render the American state a poor candidate for either autonomy or
coherence. Richardson (1987, 267), for example, describes how the
'proliferation of interest groups and diffusion of influences" among
executive agencies, "multiple committee referrals" in Congress, and
the possibility of judicial review and overturn have made U.S. trade
policies capricious and unpredictable (see also Vernon and Spar, 1989;
Destler, 1992)
The existing export subsidy programs fully confirm these
diagnoses. The U.S. export enhancement program CEEP), aimed at
dissuading the Europeans from subsidizing farm exports by matching
their export subsidies, is an interesting case study in itself to show
how the lack of clear priorities and objectives and the presence of
multiple jurisdictions can paralyze a program. The program was
opposed by 0MB from the very beginning, and supported by the USDA,
leading to infighting. The Administration's priorities changed over
time, stressing economics at some points, diplomatic relations at
others, and strategic advantage against the EC at yet other times.
The program accommodated itself to all relevant interests, and thus
served no particular interest at all. (The full story is told by
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Cloud, 1989.)
To conclude, I should emphasize that I don't pretend to have
provided solutions to any of the puzzles or questions I started out
with. In particular, the concepts of "policy coherence" and "state
autonomy" that I have used repeatedly should be viewed as no more than
descriptive categories, whose operational content still remains to be
determined. What I hope I have done is to suggest that the issues
that surround the question of policy effectiveness are both
interesting and complicated, and that they should be a fertile ground
for economists to start digging.
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